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This paper is an empirical investigation into the cross-country variation of the liquidity
eﬀect – the negative response of real interest rates to money supply shocks – with a focus
on the role of ﬁnancial factors in explaining this variation. We estimate the liquidity
eﬀect for a sample of 21 countries using VAR models in which money supply shocks are
restricted to be neutral in the long-run, then run cross-country regressions of our estimates
of the liquidity eﬀect on ﬁnancial market variables. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial factors play an
important role in determining the magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect, and that the evidence
is most consistent with generalized versions of limited participation models of the liquidity
eﬀect.
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Atlanta.1. Introduction
Over the past decade, empirical macroeconomists have accumulated substantial time-series
evidence supporting the existence of a “liquidity eﬀect” – the temporary, but persistent,
negative response of interest rates to nominal money supply shocks.1 This evidence is
inconsistent with classical assumptions of price ﬂexibility, perfect information and insignif-
icant transactions costs – money supply shocks will be matched in this case by proportional
price level responses, money will be neutral, and there will be no liquidity eﬀect. However,
the speciﬁc type of market rigidity that generates the observed liquidity eﬀect is not yet
well-understood. Understanding the sources of the liquidity eﬀect is important in distin-
guishing among alternative explanations of the monetary transmission mechanism, and
thus helping determine the types of models best suited for the analysis of monetary policy.
Time series evidence alone is possibly not rich enough to explain completely the ex-
istence and magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect. Cross-country variation in the liquidity
eﬀect is potentially informative in this regard, but has not been fully examined. To our
knowledge, no studies have systematically documented or compared the magnitude of the
liquidity eﬀect across countries. At best, extant comparisons in the literature are informal
and qualitative in nature, and are made over only a handful of countries (e.g., the G-7
countries).
In this paper, we attempt to begin ﬁlling this void in the literature. We do so by
estimating the liquidity eﬀect for a larger country sample (21 countries) than other studies,
using a common time-series technique and a careful empirical strategy for appropriately
identifying the liquidity eﬀect. We then focus on the role of ﬁnancial factors in explaining
the observed cross-country variation in our measures of the liquidity eﬀect. While our
approach is limited by the availability of consistent interest rate data and the extent to
1 A partial list of studies that ﬁnd a liquidity eﬀect in US data includes Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Hamilton (1997), Strongin
(1995), Lastrapes and Selgin (1995), Gordon and Leeper (1994) and Bernanke and Blinder
(1992). Pagan and Robertson (1995) survey some of the earlier literature. Evidence
from countries besides the US can be found in Kim (1999), Fung and Kasumovich (1998),
Lastrapes (1998), Cushman and Zha (1997), Grilli and Roubini (1996), and Sims (1992).which good proxies for ﬁnancial market factors can be found, we believe that this paper
takes a step forward in bringing international evidence to bear on the source of liquidity
eﬀects and the monetary transmission mechanism.
Institutional aspects of ﬁnancial markets – transactions costs, the prominence and
health of ﬁnancial intermediaries, the eﬃciency of secondary markets, and so on – are
likely to be important in any explanation of the existence and magnitude of the liquidity
eﬀect, regardless of the ultimate source of short-run monetary non-neutrality. We have in
mind three broad classes of models that would predict a role for such factors in explaining
the liquidity eﬀect.
First, the state of credit markets and institutions would likely have an important
eﬀect on the elasticity of money demand. For example, a highly developed banking system
might allow a large number of substitutes for money, and thus promote a high interest rate
elasticity. In this case, and in the presence of nominal rigidities in goods or labor markets,
a given change in the supply of money would be associated with a relatively small liquidity
eﬀect. Thus, characteristics of ﬁnancial markets can inﬂuence the liquidity eﬀect even
when they are not the ultimate cause of monetary non-neutralities.
Second, ﬁnancial market factors can inﬂuence the liquidity eﬀect in models of credit-
market imperfections such as the bank-lending channel of monetary transmission (e.g.
Bernanke and Gertler 1995, and Bernanke and Blinder 1988). According to these models,
which are based upon asymmetric information, changes in the money supply, by aﬀecting
the supply of bank loans, aﬀect the yield spread between bank loans and bonds and thus
the cost of funds for bank-dependent borrowers. Because spending will respond to changes
in bank loan rates for a given bond rate, the bond rate response to a money supply shock
(the liquidity eﬀect) will be smaller when the bank-lending channel is operative than when
it is not.
Finally, generalized versions of limited participation models imply a direct role for
ﬁnancial factors in explaining variation in the liquidity eﬀect. The original versions of
these dynamic general equilibrium models introduce rigidities on the saving behavior of
– 2 –households. In particular, households can re-balance their portfolios only with a lag when
money shocks occur – in eﬀect they face inﬁnite transactions costs of (immediate) portfolio
adjustment. This rigidity limits the ability of some agents to participate in ﬁnancial
markets, thereby causing a liquidity eﬀect when money is injected exogenously into those
markets.2 In Dotsey and Ireland’s (1995) generalization of the limited participation model
of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), households have at their disposal a transactions
technology that allows portfolio re-balancing at ﬁnite cost. Their model implies that the
smaller the transactions costs in ﬁnancial markets, the greater the opportunity household’s
have to react or adjust to money shocks, and the smaller is the magnitude of the liquidity
eﬀect required to clear the loanable funds market.3
The estimation procedure in our paper proceeds in two steps. First, using a time-
series sample for each country, we employ standard vector autoregression (VAR) methods
to estimate the liquidity eﬀect, as described in Section 2 of the paper. To identify money
supply shocks from the reduced form VAR, we rely on identifying restrictions implied by
long-run monetary neutrality, a well-accepted stylized fact. In the second step in Section
3, we treat the liquidity eﬀect as the dependent variable in a cross-country regression
analysis. Financial market variables are the primary independent variables of interest,
based on the motivation above, although we control for size of the money shock and other
types of rigidities that may have explanatory power. We ﬁnd that variables associated with
ﬁnancial intermediaries have substantial explanatory power for the cross-country variation
in the liquidity eﬀect. As argued later, the ﬁnding that the variables associated with
ﬁnancial intermediaries are important while broader ﬁnancial market variables are not is
more consistent with a limited participation model explanation of cross-country variation
2 Fuerst (1992), Lucas (1990) and Christiano (1991), based on the work of Rotemberg
(1984) and Grossman and Weiss (1983), are the seminal studies in this literature. Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) ﬁnds weak and qualiﬁed support for these models.
3 Walsh (1998, p. 189) also notes that the magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect should
diminish as transactions costs in ﬁnancial markets fall. In his comments on Dotsey and
Ireland, Kydland (1995, p. 1459), very much in line with our objectives, suggests that
international evidence may be useful in understanding the role of transactions costs in
driving liquidity eﬀects.
– 3 –in the liquidity eﬀect than with a bank-credit channel explanation. These results are
robust to changes in the statistical model, nonparametric rank tests, and the inclusion
of other type of rigidities and measures of the interest elasticity of money demand in the
cross-country regressions.
2. Identifying and estimating the liquidity eﬀect
2.1. The empirical model
The ﬁrst step of the empirical strategy is to use time series data to obtain estimates of the
liquidity eﬀect for each country in the sample. These estimates must be reasonable and
convincing measures of the response of interest rates to exogenous money supply shocks,
and must be consistently obtained across countries. This is a diﬃcult, but not impossible
task.
The VAR framework has been the most common means in the literature for estimating
the liquidity eﬀect, and we use this approach here. Although the approach has drawbacks,
such as a lack of economic restrictions on the dynamics of the system (Cooley and Dwyer
1998) and sensitivity to identifying restrictions (Pagan and Robertson 1998, Faust and
Leeper 1997 and Faust 1998), it has the advantage of being able to capture general dynamic
relationships and identifying economic interactions without the imposition of too much
structure. And, as noted earlier, a large number of studies using VARs with alternative
identiﬁcation schemes have found a signiﬁcant liquidity eﬀect.
To identify the liquidity eﬀect, we impose long-run monetary neutrality as the key
identifying restriction. Long-run monetary neutrality is consistent with most macroeco-
nomic models, and is generally accepted as being a good description of long-run behavior.
It is also general enough to accommodate monetary policies that diﬀer greatly across the
countries in our sample. As reported below, our estimated responses for all variables in
the system generally and reasonably match prior expectations for these eﬀects, which we
interpret as lending support to the plausibility of the identifying restrictions and statisti-
cal speciﬁcation. However, we also consider the robustness of our estimates to alternative
identiﬁcation assumptions and VAR speciﬁcations.
– 4 –A general VAR model would contain all macro variables from all countries. Clearly,
such a model would be over-parameterized given the available time series data. To make
the VAR analysis tractable, we assume that the domestic variables of country i have no
direct impact, either contemporaneously or lagged, on the economy of country j, for i 6= j.
This restriction implies that the reduced form covariance matrix for the “world-wide” VAR
is block-diagonal in each country block. This block diagonal structure allows us to collapse
the general VAR with variables from m countries into m separate, country-speciﬁc VARs.
However, these restrictions do not rule out cross-country correlations among the variables
in the system since we include a set of exogenous world aggregates in each VAR. Including
these aggregates can pick up cross-country correlations through joint dependence on these
variables. We also allow cross-country interactions by including a measure of the real
exchange in each system.4
Thus, let zit be an n×1 vector of country-speciﬁc macro variables (in ﬁrst diﬀerences),
including a nominal interest rate, for country i (i = 1···m), and wt be an h×1 vector of
exogenous world aggregates, presumably unaﬀected by economic activity in any particular
country. Suppose the country-speciﬁc variables for country i are generated by the following
structural model:
A0izit = A1izit−1 + · · · + Apizit−p + B0iwt + B1iwt−1 + · · · + Bqiwt−q + uit, (1)
for all i, in which uit is an n × 1 vector of country speciﬁc structural shocks, with Euitu0
it
normalized to equal the identity matrix.5
For notational convenience, let the lag orders p and q be one. The reduced form of
4 Not only does the block-diagonal structure preserve degrees of freedom, it eliminates
passing mis-speciﬁcation errors from one country to all others. Note that any model of a
“closed” economy implicitly makes such a set of restrictions.
5 In eﬀect, we assume that the joint system [wt zt] is block exogenous in w (Hamilton
1994, pp. 311-13). This is a standard assumption in most empirical studies of small, open
economies (e.g., Ahmed and Park 1994 and Cushman and Zha 1997). Since in this study
we are interested only in the response of domestic variables to money supply shocks, but
not world shocks, we do not compute the response of z to shocks in wt.
– 5 –this structural model is then
zit = A
−1
0i A1izit−1 + A
−1
0i (B0i + B1iL)wt + A
−1
0i uit
= Π1izit−1 + Π2i(L)wt + ti,
(2)
where Eit0





0i . This reduced form is also the VAR representation of the zit
process. Conditional on the block-diagonal restrictions, the coeﬃcients in (2) are eﬃciently
estimated by ordinary least squares applied to each equation in each country-block.6
Our objective is to use the estimated VAR in (2) to identify the responses of the
macro variables in each domestic economy, interest rates in particular, to the economy’s
own money supply shocks. As noted, we achieve this identiﬁcation by invoking long-
run monetary neutrality; to wit, permanent shocks to the nominal money supply in each
country have no impact on real variables in that country at the inﬁnite horizon.
Suppose that each vector zit contains real variables in the ﬁrst n − 1 elements and
the nominal money stock as the ﬁnal variable. Furthermore, deﬁne the ﬁnal element in
uit vector as an unpredictable shock to money supply behavior. Solving the diﬀerence
equation system in (2), and dropping the country notation for convenience, yields two
interpretations of the moving average representation of zt:
zt = (I − Π1L)Π2(L)wt + (I − Π1L)−1t ≡ G(L)wt + C(L)t
= (I − Π1L)Π2(L)wt + C(L)A
−1
0 ut ≡ G(L)wt + D(L)ut,
(3)
where C(L) = (I+C1L+C2L2+···), and D(L) = (D0+D1L+D2L2+···). The reduced form
dynamic multipliers, C(L), are obtained directly from estimation of the VAR. However,
the parameters of interest – the dynamic responses to money supply shocks – are contained
in ﬁnal columns of D(L).
Long-run monetary neutrality allows us to identify the parameters of interest from the
estimated reduced form coeﬃcients C(L) and Σ. The restriction sets the elements of the
6 The “world-wide” VAR is a system of seemingly unrelated regressions with diﬀerent
right-hand-side variables in each country-block. However, because we restrict the covari-
ance matrix of this system to be block diagonal, OLS is an eﬃcient estimation technique;
see Theil (1971, p. 309).
– 6 –ﬁnal column of D(1) ≡
P∞
i=0 Di (the set of inﬁnite-horizon multipliers on the levels of the
endogenous variables) to zero, except for the ﬁnal element. Thus, a money supply shock is
deﬁned to have a permanent eﬀect on the nominal money stock, but no permanent eﬀect
on the other (real) variables in the system. Under these restrictions, D(1) is uniquely
identiﬁed as the Cholesky factor of C(1)ΣC(1)0, and D(L) = C(L)C(1)−1D(1).7 We
take the identiﬁed dynamic response of the interest rate, after accumulating the response
functions to measure the level response, and net of the eﬀects on anticipated inﬂation, as
our measure of the liquidity eﬀect of a money supply shock.
2.2. Estimating the dynamic responses
Our sample comprises quarterly data for 21 developed countries, all but one of which are
members of the OECD, over the period 1970:1 to 1998:4.8 The sample period begins
roughly after the post-war ﬁxed exchange rate period, and ends prior to the introduction
of the Euro. The number of countries included in our sample is limited by the availability
of reliable and comparable interest rate data over the period.
We consider the following four world variables to include in w: aggregate world output
(total gross domestic product in constant prices, seasonally adjusted: OECD Main Eco-
nomic Indicators, OCDRGDPS), the aggregate world price level (consumer price index,
all items, OECD total: OECD MEI, OCDCPILT), the nominal price of oil (PPI, crude
petroleum: DRI/Citibase, PW561), and a nominal commodity price index (CRB spot mar-
ket index, all commodities: DRI/citibase, PSCCOM). The vector of domestic variables,
zt, contains a nominal interest rate, output, the real exchange rate, real money balances,
and the nominal stock of money. With certain exceptions, most of these data come from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. In most cases, output is proxied by
7 Because the Cholesky decomposition imposes a lower triangular structure on D(1), it
appears that more than just long-run neutrality has been imposed. However, Lastrapes
(1998) shows that the identiﬁed money supply response coeﬃcients are independent of
these additional restrictions. Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Shapiro and Watson (1988)
pioneered the long-run restriction approach to identifying VAR models.
8 The sample period used in estimation diﬀers for some countries due to data availability,
as noted below.
– 7 –the industrial production index, the price level (used to compute real money balances and
the real exchange rate) is the CPI, the real exchange rate is the domestic-currency value
of SDR’s times the world CPI divided by domestic CPI, and nominal money is M1. This
choice of variables is dictated primarily by data availability, but is reasonable in light of
our objectives and the need for consistency across countries. We provide complete deﬁni-
tions and sources of the country-speciﬁc data in an appendix that is separately available
(http://www.terry.uga.edu/people/last/personal/research.html).
Given our focus on the liquidity eﬀect, we use a measure of short-term yields (1-month
maturity or less) for the nominal interest rate.9 Over the sample period, Switzerland has on
average had the lowest short-term rates (3.33%), while Korea has had the highest (14.09%).
Interest rates have been most variable in South Africa, with a standard deviation of 5.18%,
and least variable in Austria, with a standard deviation of 2.09%. The overall mean short-
term rate is 9.16%, with standard deviation of 2.81%.10
For each country, we estimate the VAR in (2) as described in the previous subsection,
over the sample period given in the third and fourth columns of Table 1. The actual
estimation period begins six periods after the ﬁrst available observation to account for
diﬀerencing and lags. All variables but interest rates are transformed into natural logs,
and all variables are ﬁrst-diﬀerenced prior to estimation.11 In the interest of parsimony,
we initially estimated systems excluding world variables. For most countries, the world
aggregates were not needed to generate impulse response functions consistent with prior
beliefs about the dynamic eﬀects of positive money supply shocks – short-run increases in
output and real money balances, and a permanent increase in the price level. For some
countries, however, the world aggregates were ultimately included because the estimated
9 Our inclusion of the nominal rate of interest in the model is not inconsistent with our
method of imposing long-run monetary neutrality. In the face of one-time changes in the
level of the money supply, not its growth rate, the nominal rate will mimic the real rate at
the inﬁnite horizon since expected inﬂation will be unaﬀected at that horizon.
10 The interest rate series for Ireland and Sweden exhibit large spikes in 1992; however,
dropping these potential outliers alters none of our main ﬁndings below. Plots of the
interest rate data we use are available in the separate appendix.
11 We deal below with the possibility of model mis-speciﬁcation due to cointegration.
– 8 –responses from the parsimonious systems (without the aggregates) indicated that money
supply shocks were likely mis-identiﬁed.12
Our baseline impulse response function estimates are from VARs with ﬁve lags of the
country-speciﬁc variables (i.e. p = 5), and a constant and seasonal dummies as deter-
ministic variables. For Japan, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain, contemporaneous and
lagged values of the world aggregates are included as exogenous variables. France requires,
in addition, a linear trend term to generate a positive output response. The VARs for
the remaining countries contain no world aggregates. Of the 105 equations estimated (5
variables for 21 countries), the Q-test for residual serial correlation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at a 5% level for only three equations. We consider how sensitive the response
functions are to alternative speciﬁcations below.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 report for the baseline model the estimated (accumulated) dynamic
responses of output, the price level and real money balances to a positive money supply
shock, according to the long-run identiﬁcation scheme. The responses are plotted up to a
horizon of 40 quarters, and are shown with standard error bands computed from a standard
antithetically-accelerated Monte Carlo integration with 5000 replications (dashes). All
responses are normalized on the estimated standard deviation of the country-speciﬁc money
supply shock; i.e. the coeﬃcients reﬂect the dynamic response to a unit money supply
shock, rather than a standard deviation shock as is conventional, to standardize the size
of the shock across countries.
The estimated dynamic responses are qualitatively similar across the countries in the
sample. The price level shows a small response on impact, then gradually increases to a
new, higher steady-state value. Output generally rises in the short-run, but returns to its
steady-state value in the long-run (by the assumption of monetary neutrality). Only in
the Netherlands and Norway do the point estimates provide no convincing evidence of a
temporary positive output response. In general, real money balances rise in the short-run,
12 For example, in a few cases for the initial systems we found negative responses of
output and real money, and positive responses of the price level, which suggested a negative
aggregate supply shock rather than a positive money supply shock.
– 9 –which indicates that the price level response is smaller than the nominal money stock
response in the short-run. Only in New Zealand do the results suggest the possibility of a
short-run negative impact on real money balances.
As noted earlier, we consider the response of the real interest rate to money supply
shocks as our measure of the liquidity eﬀect. The real interest rate response cannot be
estimated directly from our model, since only the nominal rate is observable and included
in the VAR. However, it can be inferred from the nominal rate response and the price level
(P) response (the latter of which is simply the diﬀerence between the nominal money and
real money responses), as in Gali (1992) and Lastrapes (1998). Let k denote the forecast
horizon of the dynamic response functions and πh,t+k denote the rate of inﬂation at time
t + k over the following h quarters; i.e. πh,t+k ≡ ( 1















where umt is the exogenous shock to the money supply. This equation gives the response
of the per period inﬂation rate to the exogenous money impulse. But if agents use the
VAR to form expectations, then (4) shows how the path of inﬂationary expectations will
be revised in light of the money shock. Hence, (4) can be interpreted as the response of
expected inﬂation under this assumption of expectation formation. If r is the (continuously-











That is, the real rate response is the diﬀerence between the nominal rate response (directly
estimated from the identiﬁed VAR) and the response of expected inﬂation as computed in
equation (4). We set h = 1 since our interest rate measures have a maturity of one month
or less. We assume that the short run behavior of the real rate, as measured by response
functions derived in (5), reﬂects the liquidity eﬀect. It is from this response function that
we compute measures of the liquidity eﬀect used in the cross-country regressions.
Figure 4 reports the dynamic responses of real interest rates to money supply shocks
based on equation (5), along with the standard error conﬁdence bands. As with the
– 10 –previous ﬁgures, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients are relative to a unit money supply
shock. For each country in the sample, there is evidence of a liquidity eﬀect: over the
short-run, short-term real rates tend to fall in response to a money supply shock that
temporarily raises output and real money balances, and permanently raises prices and
nominal money. The only country for which the impact response is positive is Switzerland,
but the coeﬃcients become negative immediately after impact.
2.3. Interpretation and robustness
In the next section, we analyze the cross-country variation in the liquidity eﬀect by re-
gressing the estimated interest rate responses on potential explanatory variables, with a
focus on ﬁnancial factors. It is therefore important that we have properly identiﬁed money
supply shocks so that errors in the time series estimation do not bias the cross-sectional
results. It is also important that the magnitude of the estimates of the liquidity eﬀect be
robust to reasonable variation in the statistical models.
It is possible that we have confused a positive money supply shock with a temporary
negative money demand shock – for each of these shocks, interest rates will fall, and prices
and output will rise, as we ﬁnd. However, real money balances would fall initially for the
money demand shock and rise initially for the money supply shock. As seen in Figure 3,
in almost every case, real money balances rise in the short-run, lending credibility to our
interpretation of the shocks as due to unpredictable changes in money supply, given our
modelling assumptions.
The question remains – have we misinterpreted money supply shocks and found perva-
sive liquidity eﬀects because of mis-speciﬁcation of the statistical model and inappropriate
identifying restrictions?13 We consider this question along many dimensions.
We ﬁrst make straightforward changes to the VAR model. Reducing the common lag
length of the endogenous variables from ﬁve to four generally yields smoother response
functions, but does not alter the shapes or magnitudes of the dynamic responses. Like-
13 The need for careful attention to identiﬁcation and model speciﬁcation has been re-
emphasized recently by Wickens and Motto (2001).
– 11 –wise, adding contemporaneous and lagged world aggregates to the baseline speciﬁcations
generally does not alter our interpretation of money supply shocks, and has little eﬀect
on the cross-sectional inference.14 We also perform CUSUM tests on the residuals of the
baseline VARs, which provide no evidence for substantial or important structural breaks
over the sample period.
Most signiﬁcantly, we considered the possibility of model mis-speciﬁcation due to ﬁrst-
diﬀerencing the data. This restriction rules out the possibility of cointegrating relations
among the variables in the system, and requires the matrix of long-run multipliers, D(1),
to be of full-rank (under the assumption that each variable in the system has a unit
root). Because we rely on D(1) under our identiﬁcation scheme, this restriction could have
important consequences for our estimates.
Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue and trace tests for cointegration (not reported) imply
that a reasonable case can be made for a single cointegrating vector for at most half of the
countries in the sample. We therefore re-estimate the VAR models for each country in vec-
tor error correction form, imposing one cointegrating vector. As in Fung and Kasumovich
(1998), we maintain the primary identifying restriction that money is neutral in the long-
run.15 Generalizing the statistical model to allow for cointegration has essentially no eﬀect
on our estimates of the liquidity eﬀect, and no important eﬀects on the cross-country in-
ference below. The plotted response functions and cross-country regressions verifying this
claim are available from authors’ separate appendix.
It is noteworthy that our estimates of the liquidity eﬀect are qualitatively similar to
those of Fung and Kasumovich (1998), who use an identiﬁcation strategy similar to ours
for the G-6 countries. But our results are also consistent with those for the G-7 countries
14 In fact, when the price of oil was included separately, and when both the price of oil
and world output were included in the VARs, we found an increase in the importance and
statistical signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial factors in explaining the liquidity eﬀect.
15 Under this approach, D(1) is restricted to be of rank n−1 by containing all zeroes in
its ﬁnal column, but the coeﬃcients corresponding to nominal money and the price level
are constrained to be equal. See Fung and Kasumovich (1998) and Fisher, Fackler and
Orden (1995).
– 12 –found using very diﬀerent – contemporaneous – identiﬁcation strategies, such as in Kim
(1999) and Grilli and Roubini (1996). While we cannot claim that our estimates of the
liquidity eﬀect are precisely correct, they are plausible given conventional views of the
macroeconomy, consistent with other recent VAR studies, and robust to changes in the
statistical speciﬁcation.16
One further note – because our estimates of the liquidity eﬀect are used as the depen-
dent variables in the cross-sectional regressions to follow, speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation
errors in the ﬁrst stage VAR estimation will bias cross-sectional inference only if these er-
rors are correlated across countries with the regressors in those regressions. If such errors
exist but are random, they will most likely only add independent noise to the regression
error, making it more diﬃcult to uncover both economically and statistically signiﬁcant
results. As will be seen below, we ﬁnd strong and regular patterns in the cross-section
regressions that require explanation. Thus, despite the real possibility of measurement
error in estimating the liquidity eﬀect, our results reported in the following section are
of interest and, though our preferred explanation is plausible, should stimulate further
research into the validity of our claims.
3. The liquidity eﬀect across countries
3.1. Characterizing the cross-country variation
To perform the cross-country analysis, we must devise a precise measure of the liquidity
eﬀect based on the dynamic response coeﬃcients estimated above, given that the “short-
run” is not deﬁnitively identiﬁed. Based on the real interest rate responses of the previous
section, we consider three measures of the liquidity eﬀect: r1, the dynamic response at
impact (the one-quarter horizon), rm, the maximum (absolute) real rate response (which
is negative in all countries), and rc, the average response over the ﬁrst eight quarters. The
16 The fact that our results are consistent with those generated from short-run restric-
tions mitigates to some extent the Faust-Leeper (1997) criticisms of inﬁnite-horizon re-
strictions. The robustness of the response functions to alternative statistical models also
helps, since the Faust-Leeper critique focuses on the sensitivity of the estimated response
to the the statistical speciﬁcation under inﬁnite-horizon restrictions.
– 13 –diﬀerent measures give diﬀerent weights to the particular timing and persistence of the
estimated liquidity eﬀect.
Table 1 reports these measures of the liquidity eﬀect for each of the countries, from
the baseline VAR estimates. As in the ﬁgures, all measures of interest rate responses are
in basis points and in relation to a unit money supply shock. The table also reports the
country rank for each measure, where 1 denotes the largest (absolute) value across the 21
countries in the sample.
The table indicates that there is ample variation across countries to be explained.
Across countries, the mean liquidity eﬀect on impact (r1) is 75 basis points, and the
standard deviation is 52 basis points. The mean is 97 basis points for the maximum
eﬀect (rm) and 47 basis points for the average eﬀect (rc), with corresponding standard
deviations of 43 and 29. The measures range from -187 basis points (Belgium) to 56 basis
points (Switzerland) on impact, -187 (Belgium) to -33 (Portugal) for the maximum, and
-115 (Belgium) to -8 (Austria) for the average eﬀect. The ranks are relatively stable across
measures; for example, Belgium has the largest liquidity eﬀect for each proxy, the UK
ranks either second, third, or fourth, and Portugal generally ranks toward the back of the
pack. On the other hand, Switzerland and New Zealand have rank changes larger than 10.
3.2. The role of ﬁnancial market variables
Our primary objective is to examine the extent to which ﬁnancial factors explain the
observed cross-country variation in the liquidity eﬀect. To this end, we estimate regressions
of the following form:
yi = β0 + β1σm + γxi + i, i = 1,· · ·,21, (6)
where yi is the estimated liquidity eﬀect (r1, rm, or rc), σm is the standard deviation of
the money supply shock estimated from the VAR, and xi is a ﬁnancial market variable.
The money supply standard error is included as a control variable to account for potential
non-linearities in scale eﬀects and to allow for the possible eﬀects of liquidity risk.17 Re-
17 For example, Fuerst’s model (1992, p. 15) implies that the higher is money supply
– 14 –gressions of this sort have been used before; for example, Cecchetti (1999) performs similar
regressions in his analysis on the relationship between ﬁnancial structure and the impact
of monetary policy on output and prices across the members of the European Monetary
Union.18
We use the following ﬁnancial variables for x in the regressions: the ratios of bank
assets to GDP, private credit to GDP, liquid liabilities to GDP, bank credit to GDP,
commercial bank credit to the sum of commercial and central bank credit, privately issued
debt to GDP, national stock market capitalization to GDP, the turnover rate in the stock
market, an index of ﬁnancial market depth, the ratio of aggregate bank reserves to demand
deposits, and the ratio of bank reserves to total deposits. These variables are presumably
related to the level of ﬁnancial services, the functioning of ﬁnancial markets, and the
importance of ﬁnancial intermediaries in the economy. They are also likely to be related to
transactions costs in ﬁnancial markets and therefore the degree to which households can
participate in these markets.
The ﬁrst ﬁve variables, which are closely related to the ﬁnancial intermediary sector,
have been constructed and used to measure the provision of ﬁnancial services by Levine,
Loayza and Beck (2000) in their study of the sources of economic growth. In particular,
these variables attempt to measure the relative size (bank asset, bank credit to total credit,
and liquid liabilities ratios) and activity (private and bank credit ratios) of banks in the
economy. In addition, we consider the reserve ratio proxies as possibly related to the degree
variance, the greater is the liquidity risk faced by households. They respond by increasing
bank deposits for precautionary purposes, making money injections less important in the
loanable funds market. This would tend to reduce the liquidity eﬀect, that is, lead to a
positive β1 coeﬃcient. Since households respond to increases in money supply variance by
increasing their holdings of bank deposits, and since intermediaries expand asset holdings
as deposits rise, money supply variance is expected to be positively correlated with many
of the variables we use for x, especially the bank ratios noted below. Thus, it is essential
to control for money supply volatility in the cross-country regressions, given our focus on
estimating the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial market variables on the liquidity eﬀect.
18 Karras (1999), in studying how openness alters monetary policy eﬀects across coun-
tries, uses a panel approach. The nature of his strategy, however, does not allow him to
identify money supply shocks as we do.
– 15 –of ﬁnancial intermediary services. These variables are averages over the 1960-1995 period
(1974-1998 for the reserve ratios), a sample similar to the one used to estimate the VAR
models.
The next three variables are frequently used to capture the depth, liquidity, and
sophistication of all ﬁnancial markets (e.g. Cecchetti 1999), and are thus broader than
the previous ﬁve proxies. The ﬁnancial market depth variable is a summary index of
privately issued debt, stock market capitalization and the turnover rate, and is similar in
construction to Cecchetti’s (1999) index of alternative ﬁnance. These last four variables
are measured at a single point in time (1996) near the end of our sample.19 Table 2
contains the data for the ﬁnancial market proxies along with summary statistics, where
the countries are identiﬁed by number as in Table 1. Sources and complete descriptions of
these variables are contained in the separate appendix.
Table 3 reports the regression results for each of the three measures of the liquidity ef-
fect, and each of the ﬁnancial market proxies. We do not have suﬃcient degrees of freedom
to include all ﬁnancial variables in a single regression, so we consider the alternative mea-
sures in separate regressions. The table reports conventional OLS t-statistics for inference;
however, these statistics are almost identical to those computed from White’s consistent
estimator of the covariance matrix allowing for heteroskedasticity.
In each regression, the constant term is signiﬁcantly less than zero at very small levels
of signiﬁcance. The estimated coeﬃcient on money supply variability is signiﬁcant in
almost all of the regressions, and is positive – the higher the variance, the smaller is the
liquidity eﬀect. This result is in line with the liquidity risk story of Fuerst mentioned in
footnote 17.
Of primary interest is the coeﬃcient on ﬁnancial market variables, γ. The estimated
γ for the debt ratio, market capitalization, turnover, and the depth index, as well the
reserve ratios, are generally small and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Only for the
turnover ratio in the r1 and rc regressions does the marginal signiﬁcance level approach
19 Using sample averages for these variables rather than point-in-time estimates does not
alter the regression results discussed below.
– 16 –a reasonably small value. However, the proxies based primarily on the size and activity
of ﬁnancial intermediaries (excluding the reserve ratios) – bank assets, private credit,
liquid liabilities, bank credit, and the bank credit to central bank credit ratio – all have
statistically signiﬁcant explanatory power at typical test size for the liquidity eﬀect, and
are consistently positive. The positive coeﬃcient means that as the bank ratio increases,
the liquidity eﬀect becomes a smaller negative number. This inference is robust across the
diﬀerent measures of the liquidity eﬀect. The overall ﬁt of the regressions including these
variables is good: the lowest R2 is 33% and the highest 63%.20
While statistical signiﬁcance is important in understanding the extent to which sam-
pling error aﬀects inference, a coeﬃcient estimate that is statistically signiﬁcant (for an
arbitrary test size) need not be economically important. One way to determine the impor-
tance of the eﬀect is to consider how much the liquidity eﬀect would change for a typical
change in x. For example, the average country in our sample has a liquidity eﬀect on
impact (r1) of −75 basis points (Table 1) and a bank asset ratio (BA) of 64.5% (Table
2). According to the estimates in Table 3, a country having a bank asset ratio of 88%, or
one standard deviation above the mean, will have a liquidity eﬀect of −36 basis points,
39 basis points smaller than average (39 = 1.67 × 23.46). This quantity is 75% of r1’s
cross-country standard deviation of 52 basis points (Table 1).
The other ﬁnancial market variables have similar quantitative eﬀects on r1: private
credit – 35 basis points; liquid liabilities – 34 basis points; bank credit – 41 basis points;
share of commercial credit – 28 basis points. The latter creates the largest reduction in the
maximum liquidity eﬀect (rm) – 22.5 basis points, which is 54% of the standard deviation
in rm. Liquid liabilities (LL) has the largest eﬀect on rc – 16.2 basis points, or 56% of
its cross-country variation. Overall, these results suggest that the explanatory power of
the ﬁnancial market factors for cross-country variation in the liquidity eﬀect is plausible,
20 Informal inspection of Table 2 suggests that Switzerland (country 19) may be an outlier
for bank assets, private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank credit. To see if Switzerland
drives the results, we dropped it from the sample; the only eﬀect is to render liquid
liabilities marginally insigniﬁcant for r1 and rc, even though the quantitative eﬀect is the
same.
– 17 –non-trivial, and not likely to be aﬀected by sampling error.21
3.3. Robustness
We discussed earlier that these results are not sensitive to a number of changes in the sta-
tistical model generating the liquidity eﬀect estimates. Here, we provide further evidence
of the robustness of these results by computing non-parametric rank-order correlations,
and including other variables in the regressions that could explain cross-country variation
in the liquidity eﬀect.
The ﬁnal column of Table 3 reports Spearman’s rank-correlation coeﬃcient (Siegel
1956) for the liquidity eﬀect measures and the ﬁnancial market variables. Correlations
based on rank are less sensitive to extreme point estimates than correlations estimated
from the regression model. The table shows that at a 5% signiﬁcance level, the null
hypothesis of no correlation can be rejected in favor a positive correlation for the same
variables that are signiﬁcantly non-zero in the regression analysis.
To the extent that our measures of ﬁnancial market factors are correlated with vari-
ables representing other causes of variation in the liquidity eﬀect, our previous estimates
will be biased and our inferences may be incorrect. We consider the robustness of the
results to three other potential alternative explanations of variation in the liquidity eﬀect.
The ﬁrst is variation in the extent of capital mobility across open economies. The
fewer the restrictions on international capital ﬂows, the lower the variability in interest
rate responses to country-speciﬁc monetary shocks, which could explain diﬀerences in the
magnitude of liquidity eﬀects across countries independently of ﬁnancial market channels.
Consequently, we have estimated regressions that add a capital mobility proxy to the
basic regression model. We use as our capital mobility proxy the index of capital account
21 Our approach exploits variation in the time-averages of the liquidity eﬀect and ﬁnan-
cial market factors across countries. An alternative approach, as suggested by a referee, is
to exploit variation over time in the liquidity eﬀect and ﬁnancial market structure within
countries, perhaps due to discrete changes in regulations or innovations in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. While our CUSUM tests indicated little signiﬁcant structural change in the estimated
VAR models, this line of research is clearly of potential interest. However, such an analysis,
done carefully and correctly, lies well beyond the scope of our paper.
– 18 –openness developed by Quinn (1997). He constructs the index for a variety of industrialized
and developing economies based on careful consideration of capital account restrictions
imposed by each country. The only countries in our sample not considered by Quinn
are Korea and South Africa, so the regressions reported in Table 4 exclude both of these
countries from the sample. The index ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values implying
greater capital mobility; thus, the expected sign of the coeﬃcient on this variable is positive.
The speciﬁc values of the index used in our regressions are the average values over the period
1974-1997.22 The results in Table 4 indicate essentially no eﬀect of capital mobility on the
magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect. Only in one case is the coeﬃcient on the capital mobility
proxy statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better, but the pattern of signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients on the ﬁnancial proxies is similar to that in Table 3. The only noteworthy
diﬀerence is that the coeﬃcients on the turnover proxy are now statistically signiﬁcant.23
Diﬀerences in the extent of wage and price rigidity in an economy are another possible
reason for diﬀerences in the magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect, and we have estimated
equations that add rigidity proxies to the base model. Other things equal, we expect that
the more rigid are wages and prices, the bigger the change in real money balances following
a change in nominal money, and, consequently, the bigger the liquidity eﬀect. Measuring
the extent of wage and/or price rigidity is diﬃcult, but Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983)
provide measures of nominal and real wage stickiness for 18 of the 21 countries in our
sample.24 Measures are not available for Korea, Portugal, and South Africa. The higher
22 Time series of his index for each of the countries in our cross-section (except, as noted
earlier, for Korea and South Africa) were kindly provided by Professor Dennis Quinn of
Georgetown University.
23 An alternative capital mobility proxy has been suggested by Obstfeld and Taylor
(1997) who use relative patterns of dispersion of the real interest rate to proxy for variation
in capital mobility across countries. If a country’s capital market is well-integrated with
world capital markets, a shock to the real rate should be mitigated quickly if capital
mobility is high, and the standard deviation of the real rate should be low. Thus, standard
deviations of ex post real interest rates might be used as a proxy for diﬀerences in capital
mobility. Unfortunately, this type of real interest rate based measure is inappropriate given
our focus on the liquidity eﬀect.
24 These measures are based on estimates of wage and price equations using annual data
– 19 –the value of these measures, the stickier are wages. Consequently, a negative coeﬃcient is
expected on the wage rigidity proxies since the greater the extent of stickiness, the greater
the liquidity eﬀect. The coeﬃcient estimates for the transaction costs proxies and nominal
and real wage rigidity proxies are reported in Table 5. There is essentially no evidence that
the wage rigidity proxies explain a signiﬁcant amount of the cross-country variation in the
liquidity eﬀect; in only two cases is the coeﬃcient on the wage rigidity proxy signiﬁcant.
In the case of the ﬁnancial variables, the pattern of signiﬁcance is essentially identical to
that in Table 3.
Finally, as noted in the introduction, ﬁnancial market variables may simply capture
diﬀerences in the interest rate elasticity of money demand across countries. Indeed, if large
bank ratios are associated with high money demand elasticity, then the positive coeﬃcients
found in the cross-country regressions are consistent with this idea. To determine if the
bank ratios have an independent eﬀect on the liquidity eﬀect, we include a direct measure
of the interest rate semi-elasticity of demand in the regressions. We use, as a measure
of this semi-elasticity, the coeﬃcient on the interest rate in the cointegration relationship
estimated above as part of our robustness check, which in general can be reasonably inter-
preted as a money demand relationship. We set up the regression so that a high money
demand elasticity corresponds to a large value for the semi-elasticity measure; hence, we
expect a positive coeﬃcient on the semi-elasticity variable. Table 6 shows that indeed
this is the case, with a high degree of statistical conﬁdence.25 Quantitatively, a standard
deviation increase in semi-elasticity (1.65%) reduces the liquidity eﬀect by between 12 and
20 basis points. But most importantly, while magnitudes are generally reduced, the ﬁnan-
for 1957-1980 and are provided in Table 3, p. 25 of Grubb, Jackman, and Layard. The
nominal rigidity measure has recently been employed by Fischer (1997) in a study of the
institutional determinants of the speed of disinﬂation.
25 We have adjusted the standard errors on the estimate of γ to account for the fact
that the semi-elasticity regressors have been generated from a ﬁrst step regression, using
Murphy and Topel (1985). In making this adjustment, we assumed independence across
the cointegration regressions. Since the t-statistics for β2 test the null hypothesis that
β2 = 0, no adjustment to these standard errors is required. See Murphy and Topel (1985,
equation 9).
– 20 –cial intermediary variables remain for the most part both statistically and economically
signiﬁcant.
3.4. Interpretation and assessment
To this point, we have documented the existence of a liquidity eﬀect and a statistically
and economically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial market factors in explaining this
liquidity eﬀect. We now assess this evidence in light of the three potential explanations
discussed in the introduction. Speciﬁcally, we consider whether our results shed light on
or distinguish among the possible explanations of the liquidity eﬀect and its magnitude.
As noted above, ﬁnancial variables could reﬂect variation in money demand elasticities.
However, we ﬁnd that such variation can not provide a complete explanation of the liquidity
eﬀect – ﬁnancial variables maintain independent eﬀects on the estimated cross-country
variation even after including proxies for money demand elasticity. In addition, we ﬁnd no
evidence that cross-country diﬀerences in nominal or real wage rigidities can explain the
magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect. Hence, rigidities in labor markets coupled with diﬀerent
money demand elasticities is not likely to be a complete explanation of the cross-country
variation. Our robustness tests also imply that the cross-country explanatory power of
ﬁnancial factors is not due to correlations with the openness of the economies.
The fact that the ﬁnancial market proxies most related to the size and activity of
ﬁnancial intermediaries have the strongest and most certain impact on the liquidity eﬀect
seems to provide ample support for bank-lending channel theories. If we assume that
the greater the bank asset and credit ratios the more important is bank ﬁnancing to the
economy, and hence the more likely the importance of a bank lending channel (as in
Cecchetti, 1999, pp. 14-15), then the positive coeﬃcients we ﬁnd in the cross-country
regressions indeed support this view.
However, these aggregate ﬁnancial intermediary ratios may be ambiguous proxies for
the bank-lending channel. Indeed, Cecchetti (1999) also argues that ﬁrms with good access
to capital markets are more likely to be found in countries with extensively developed bond
and stock markets. In this case, the bank lending channel should decrease in importance
– 21 –with increases in our more general ﬁnancial market ratios, such as market capitalization,
implying a negative coeﬃcient on these broader ratios in the cross-country regressions. In
general, our estimates for these coeﬃcients in Tables 3 through 6 are positive, though small
and statistically signiﬁcant.
A stronger test for the bank lending channel is to regress the liquidity eﬀect on the
bank ratios and market capitalization, thereby controlling for the possibility that the non-
negative coeﬃcients on market capitalization are primarily due to omitted variable bias
in the cross-sectional regressions. In light of the discussion in the previous paragraph,
the bank lending channel would imply a positive coeﬃcient on the bank ratios, but a
negative coeﬃcient on market capitalization. The results, reported in Table 7, reveal that
the coeﬃcient estimates on market capitalization remain mostly positive and are always
statistically insigniﬁcant. Thus, we interpret our results as providing at best only limited
and qualiﬁed support for the bank-lending channel as a determinant of variation in the
liquidity eﬀect.
Finally, Dotsey and Ireland’s (1995) generalized version of limited participation models
implies that countries with low transactions costs will exhibit small liquidity eﬀects, and
vice versa. In this model, households have access to cash-management technologies that
allow portfolio adjustment with positive but ﬁnite costs in the form of time and resources.
In this case, households can at least partially reduce their savings through bank deposits
in reaction to a monetary injection. The smaller the costs of adjustment, the larger the
adjustment made and the smaller is the eﬀect of the injection on the supply of loanable
funds.
It is reasonable to assume that high values for the bank size and activity variables,
as well as the measures of overall ﬁnancial market depth and liquidity, reﬂect low costs of
ﬁnancial transactions. Thus, these models generally imply a positive relationship between
these ﬁnancial market variables and the magnitude of the liquidity eﬀect. The coeﬃcient
on the reserve ratios, however, is ambiguous under limited participation models. In Li
(2000), liquidity eﬀects occur through a household credit channel, and the reserve-deposit
– 22 –ratio is one measure for the supply of household credit by the credit service industry. In
this case, the lower the reserve ratio, the greater the supply of loanable funds for any
given monetary injection, and the greater the liquidity eﬀect. On the other hand, high
bank reserve ratios may reﬂect low availability of ﬁnancial intermediation services, high
transactions costs, and thus imply a negative coeﬃcient in the cross-country regressions.
We interpret our results as providing strong support for the generalized limited partic-
ipation models, at least relative to the alternatives considered. We ﬁnd robust, statistically
signiﬁcant, and economically non-trivial positive coeﬃcients on the proxies representing
bank size and activity. The link between these proxies and ﬁnancial transactions costs is
intuitively strong, and is consistent with ﬁndings in studies linking these variables to other
measures of economic activity. And as seen in Table 3, we even pick up the ambiguity in
the reserve ratio variables.
Finally, the diﬀerence between the strength of the cross-sectional explanatory power
across the two types of ﬁnancial market factors (banking size and activity versus the
broader measures), even after controlling for the possibility of correlation between these
diﬀerent types, lends support to limited participation models. While it is possible that
the bank measures are simply better proxies for transactions costs, one could argue that
it is the presence of banks and ﬁnancial intermediaries per se that determines the extent
of household participation in ﬁnancial markets.
4. Conclusion
Our systematic analysis of the cross-country variation in the liquidity eﬀect uncovers an
important role for ﬁnancial market factors, and provides support for limited participation
models as an explanation for the liquidity eﬀect. This conclusion is conditional on our
identiﬁcation strategy, but is robust to alternate statistical speciﬁcations for the time-series
model generating the estimates of the liquidity eﬀect, and to diﬀerent control variables
in the cross-country regressions. Overall, the ﬁndings imply that rigidities in ﬁnancial
markets, as envisioned in the generalized versions of the limited participation model of
Dotsey and Ireland (1995), are a potentially important part of the monetary transmission
– 23 –mechanism.
We acknowledge that there are many potential problems with our empirical strategy
and implementation. In particular, our inference relies heavily on proper identiﬁcation
of money supply shocks and the liquidity eﬀect in the time-series analysis. Because such
identiﬁcation is inherently diﬃcult in VAR models, it is certainly possible that our esti-
mates of the liquidity eﬀect are mis-measured, with unknown consequences for the second
step regressions. Other models may yield diﬀerent results. But many of these problems
would tend to hide the sort of cross-sectional patterns we ﬁnd in the international data.
Thus, our approach has most likely captured something relevant and systematic about the
cross-country variation in the liquidity eﬀect.
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– 28 –Table 1. Estimated liquidity eﬀects
Country Begin End r1 rank rm rank rc rank
1 Australia 70:1 96:2 -33.98 17 -33.98 20 -22.06 17
2 Austria 70:1 98:1 -29.45 19 -67.18 15 -8.41 21
3 Belgium 70:1 98:1 -186.61 1 -186.61 1 -114.55 1
4 Canada 75:1 98:1 -131.44 2 -131.44 5 -74.00 5
5 Denmark 72:1 98:1 -93.78 9 -143.82 3 -64.11 7
6 France 70:1 98:1 -122.81 4 -122.81 7 -62.70 8
7 Germany 70:1 98:1 -45.55 16 -59.95 17 -14.26 19
8 Ireland 73:1 98:1 -81.76 10 -123.30 6 -65.80 6
9 Italy 71:1 98:1 -106.13 6 -106.85 10 -88.50 2
10 Japan 70:1 98:1 -74.72 11 -74.72 14 -31.91 12
11 Korea 76:4 97:4 -63.40 13 -134.63 4 -46.80 10
12 Netherlands 70:1 97:4 -50.89 15 -61.02 16 -29.51 14
13 New Zealand 70:1 98:1 -97.89 7 -97.89 11 -12.50 20
14 Norway 70:1 98:1 -96.30 8 -96.30 12 -78.83 3
15 Portugal 81:1 98:1 -3.85 20 -32.95 21 -17.59 18
16 South Africa 70:1 98:1 -73.23 12 -81.02 13 -51.19 9
17 Spain 74:1 98:1 -121.54 5 -121.54 8 -45.34 11
18 Sweden 70:1 98:1 -59.21 14 -59.21 18 -27.17 15
19 Switzerland 75:4 98:1 55.84 21 -116.45 9 -26.45 16
20 UK 70:1 98:1 -123.57 3 -157.66 2 -74.74 4
21 US 70:1 98:1 -31.12 18 -37.73 19 -30.01 13
µ -74.83 -97.48 -46.97
σ 52.20 42.58 28.80
Dependent variables in the cross-country regressions, estimated over given sample period.
r1 is the response of the real interest rate at horizon 1, rm is the maximum (absolute)
response, and rc is the average response over eight quarters, all to a unit money supply
shock. µ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation.
– 29 –Table 2. Financial market variables
D/Y MC MD TO R/D R/T BA PC LL BC CB
1 28.40 76.40 2.00 52.20 22.40 4.60 47.80 54.82 51.73 34.01 92.67
2 45.68 14.60 2.00 61.80 46.40 5.10 81.36 65.30 67.50 62.30 98.44
3 60.19 44.70 2.00 23.20 5.60 1.50 58.12 25.65 49.02 25.39 92.01
4 18.44 79.50 2.00 62.20 14.30 3.10 42.35 60.86 56.50 35.51 89.00
5 100.65 39.20 3.00 54.20 8.20 3.80 49.87 42.45 49.48 42.13 88.10
6 48.44 38.00 2.00 49.80 6.70 2.40 62.50 75.47 63.37 55.36 96.54
7 57.06 28.10 3.00 123.20 34.40 6.90 88.89 76.46 57.46 71.00 97.57
8 12.18 16.80 1.00 24.50 38.50 11.10 36.77 49.14 54.74 28.14 94.73
9 36.81 21.00 1.00 43.80 29.30 14.80 73.13 59.09 77.48 58.13 87.77
10 39.14 67.10 2.00 37.10 8.20 2.10 98.94 128.38 125.94 88.63 96.72
11 43.03 26.70 2.00 110.50 58.80 11.00 42.24 65.48 41.02 40.09 83.95
12 47.80 96.40 3.00 92.40 2.60 0.60 70.88 86.69 71.41 52.35 98.10
13 7.97 58.60 1.00 28.10 5.70 1.90 30.55 37.59 49.63 25.44 82.43
14 24.97 36.30 2.00 70.30 5.40 1.70 57.31 81.62 54.04 40.76 90.02
15 18.81 22.70 1.00 33.20 80.40 17.70 74.85 55.01 78.02 60.66 90.35
16 6.05 172.00 1.00 10.40 18.60 4.60 56.91 71.94 51.44 49.22 94.77
17 11.02 41.70 1.00 113.10 48.50 12.10 74.81 65.05 70.31 58.37 92.74
18 70.69 94.40 3.00 64.40 2.60 2.60 49.43 89.11 53.49 42.28 88.94
19 62.03 136.00 3.00 94.00 25.50 5.70 133.08 141.29 123.41 119.13 98.99
20 43.68 147.00 3.00 36.80 1.90 1.90 54.78 46.31 48.63 45.55 83.55
21 62.58 109.00 3.00 92.80 11.60 4.30 70.42 113.07 62.12 58.42 93.11
µ 40.27 65.06 2.05 60.86 22.65 5.69 64.52 70.99 64.61 52.04 91.93
σ 24.06 45.81 0.80 32.48 21.57 4.81 23.46 28.88 22.31 21.92 5.02
D/Y is debt/GDP, MC is market capitalization, MD is the index of market depth, TO
is the turnover rate, R/D is the ratio of reserves to demand deposits, R/T is the ratio
of reserves to total deposits, BA are bank assets, PC is private credit, LL are liquid
liabilities, BC is bank credit, and CB is the ratio of commercial credit to central bank
credit. Countries are identiﬁed by number, as in Table 1.
– 30 –Table 3. Cross-country regressions and rank correlations
y x β0 (tstat) β1 (tstat) γ (tstat) R2 ρ
r1 D/Y -113.16 ( -3.65 ) 1.99 ( 1.28 ) 0.35 ( 0.71 ) 0.10 0.24
rm D/Y -123.89 ( -5.27 ) 2.56 ( 2.18 ) -0.12 ( -0.33 ) 0.22 -0.01
rc D/Y -67.77 ( -4.17 ) 1.65 ( 2.03 ) 0.01 ( 0.06 ) 0.19 0.06
r1 MC -113.23 ( -4.07 ) 1.92 ( 1.26 ) 0.23 ( 0.90 ) 0.11 -0.01
rm MC -134.39 ( -6.31 ) 2.62 ( 2.25 ) 0.07 ( 0.38 ) 0.22 0.05
rc MC -70.73 ( -4.83 ) 1.66 ( 2.06 ) 0.05 ( 0.40 ) 0.19 0.00
r1 MD -142.31 ( -3.70 ) 2.21 ( 1.47 ) 19.73 ( 1.39 ) 0.16 0.27
rm MD -143.38 ( -4.76 ) 2.71 ( 2.30 ) 6.17 ( 0.56 ) 0.23 0.05
rc MD -84.12 ( -4.13 ) 1.77 ( 2.23 ) 7.52 ( 1.00 ) 0.23 0.12
r1 TO -133.36 ( -4.45 ) 1.98 ( 1.36 ) 0.56 ( 1.66 ) 0.20 0.33
rm TO -145.06 ( -6.15 ) 2.66 ( 2.32 ) 0.25 ( 0.92 ) 0.25 0.18
rc TO -87.10 ( -5.70 ) 1.71 ( 2.30 ) 0.32 ( 1.82 ) 0.31 0.28
r1 R/D -107.75 ( -4.87 ) 1.19 ( 0.77 ) 0.81 ( 1.50 ) 0.18 0.40
rm R/D -131.52 ( -7.50 ) 2.47 ( 2.02 ) 0.17 ( 0.39 ) 0.22 0.15
rc R/D -70.37 ( -5.93 ) 1.42 ( 1.73 ) 0.26 ( 0.90 ) 0.22 0.30
r1 R/T -103.61 ( -4.40 ) 1.50 ( 0.93 ) 1.83 ( 0.71 ) 0.10 0.38
rm R/T -128.88 ( -7.19 ) 2.64 ( 2.14 ) -0.17 ( -0.09 ) 0.22 0.17
rc R/T -65.66 ( -5.34 ) 1.73 ( 2.04 ) -0.45 ( -0.33 ) 0.19 0.22
r1 BA -227.74 ( -6.93 ) 3.71 ( 3.22 ) 1.66 ( 4.48 ) 0.56 0.39
rm BA -191.12 ( -6.00 ) 3.48 ( 3.12 ) 0.79 ( 2.19 ) 0.38 0.34
rc BA -116.94 ( -5.62 ) 2.35 ( 3.23 ) 0.64 ( 2.71 ) 0.42 0.27
r1 PC -191.22 ( -6.62 ) 2.56 ( 2.21 ) 1.20 ( 3.93 ) 0.50 0.49
rm PC -185.16 ( -7.44 ) 3.02 ( 3.03 ) 0.71 ( 2.72 ) 0.44 0.46
rc PC -103.98 ( -5.98 ) 1.92 ( 2.75 ) 0.47 ( 2.57 ) 0.41 0.27
r1 LL -197.69 ( -5.23 ) 2.90 ( 2.20 ) 1.35 ( 3.02 ) 0.39 0.38
rm LL -178.12 ( -5.52 ) 3.11 ( 2.76 ) 0.66 ( 1.72 ) 0.33 0.45
rc LL -106.17 ( -4.93 ) 2.05 ( 2.72 ) 0.53 ( 2.07 ) 0.34 0.30
r1 BC -214.37 ( -8.10 ) 3.48 ( 3.36 ) 1.86 ( 5.21 ) 0.63 0.52
rm BC -180.29 ( -6.42 ) 3.31 ( 3.02 ) 0.81 ( 2.14 ) 0.37 0.43
rc BC -113.67 ( -6.55 ) 2.29 ( 3.37 ) 0.74 ( 3.17 ) 0.48 0.41
r1 CB -621.23 ( -3.12 ) 2.97 ( 2.14 ) 5.55 ( 2.64 ) 0.33 0.49
rm CB -552.81 ( -3.82 ) 3.50 ( 3.47 ) 4.49 ( 2.94 ) 0.47 0.35
rc CB -316.25 ( -2.99 ) 2.17 ( 2.94 ) 2.64 ( 2.37 ) 0.38 0.37
The regression is yi = β0 + β1σmi + γxi + i, where y is the liquidity eﬀect, σmi is the
estimated standard deviation of the money supply shock, and x is a measure of ﬁnancial
market transactions costs. ρ is Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient, which we obtain by
regressing the rank of y on the rank of x. According to Table P in Siegel (1956), the 5%
critical value under the null of no correspondence is 0.368 for 21 observations. See notes
to Tables 1 and 2 for variable deﬁnitions.
– 31 –Table 4. Cross-country regressions including capital mobility
y x γ (tstat) β2 (tstat)
r1 D/Y 0.191 ( 0.30 ) 21.384 ( 0.66 )
rm D/Y -0.051 ( -0.11 ) -0.162 ( -0.01 )
rc D/Y -0.056 ( -0.16 ) 6.740 ( 0.39 )
r1 MC 0.215 ( 0.55 ) 16.546 ( 0.50 )
rm MC -0.030 ( -0.10 ) -0.094 ( -0.00 )
rc MC 0.059 ( 0.28 ) 2.652 ( 0.15 )
r1 MD 21.227 ( 0.99 ) 2.811 ( 0.08 )
rm MD 16.463 ( 1.05 ) -19.638 ( -0.74 )
rc MD 10.716 ( 0.94 ) -6.524 ( -0.34 )
r1 TO 0.687 ( 1.55 ) 11.350 ( 0.41 )
rm TO 0.631 ( 2.04 ) -15.154 ( -0.78 )
rc TO 0.460 ( 2.07 ) -4.669 ( -0.33 )
r1 R/D 1.174 ( 1.92 ) 39.997 ( 1.53 )
rm R/D 0.449 ( 0.92 ) 3.795 ( 0.18 )
rc R/D 0.396 ( 1.14 ) 9.951 ( 0.67 )
r1 R/T 2.458 ( 0.87 ) 30.765 ( 1.10 )
rm R/T 0.415 ( 0.20 ) -0.692 ( -0.03 )
rc R/T -0.310 ( -0.20 ) 4.745 ( 0.31 )
r1 BA 1.745 ( 4.57 ) 23.035 ( 1.27 )
rm BA 0.755 ( 1.95 ) -2.848 ( -0.15 )
rc BA 0.652 ( 2.48 ) 4.109 ( 0.33 )
r1 PC 1.166 ( 3.55 ) 17.017 ( 0.82 )
rm PC 0.718 ( 2.67 ) -7.146 ( -0.42 )
rc PC 0.468 ( 2.31 ) 1.605 ( 0.12 )
r1 LL 1.704 ( 3.84 ) 44.341 ( 2.16 )
rm LL 0.654 ( 1.53 ) 5.491 ( 0.28 )
rc LL 0.611 ( 2.10 ) 11.799 ( 0.88 )
r1 BC 1.862 ( 5.01 ) 20.221 ( 1.17 )
rm BC 0.788 ( 1.99 ) -4.009 ( -0.22 )
rc BC 0.740 ( 2.87 ) 2.913 ( 0.24 )
r1 CB 6.577 ( 2.91 ) 29.201 ( 1.30 )
rm CB 4.152 ( 2.33 ) 0.405 ( 0.02 )
rc CB 2.963 ( 2.31 ) 6.639 ( 0.52 )
The regression is yi = β0+β1σmi+β2hi+γxi+i, where h is the proxy for capital mobility.
See notes to Tables , 2 and 3 for variable deﬁnitions.
– 32 –Table 5. Cross-country regressions including nominal and real wage rigidities
y x γ(nom) (tstat) β2(nom) (tstat) γ(real) (tstat) β2(real) (tstat)
r1 D/Y 0.58 ( 1.03 ) -11.60 ( -0.59 ) 0.52 ( 0.95 ) -24.78 ( -1.18 )
rm D/Y 0.01 ( 0.01 ) 4.70 ( 0.32 ) 0.00 ( 0.01 ) -18.20 ( -1.17 )
rc D/Y 0.07 ( 0.22 ) -8.74 ( -0.83 ) 0.02 ( 0.07 ) -18.15 ( -1.65 )
r1 MC 0.48 ( 1.44 ) -14.88 ( -0.78 ) 0.41 ( 1.28 ) -24.19 ( -1.18 )
rm MC 0.01 ( 0.03 ) 4.63 ( 0.31 ) 0.01 ( 0.04 ) -18.18 ( -1.17 )
rc MC 0.14 ( 0.74 ) -10.04 ( -0.95 ) 0.09 ( 0.50 ) -17.89 ( -1.64 )
r1 MD 31.69 ( 1.98 ) -14.73 ( -0.82 ) 30.32 ( 2.00 ) -26.71 ( -1.40 )
rm MD 12.69 ( 1.01 ) 2.54 ( 0.18 ) 13.48 ( 1.14 ) -18.71 ( -1.26 )
rc MD 11.51 ( 1.29 ) -10.45 ( -1.04 ) 10.53 ( 1.27 ) -18.58 ( -1.79 )
r1 TO 0.93 ( 2.31 ) -15.56 ( -0.90 ) 0.91 ( 2.40 ) -28.23 ( -1.55 )
rm TO 0.63 ( 2.12 ) 0.47 ( 0.04 ) 0.66 ( 2.41 ) -20.13 ( -1.54 )
rc TO 0.52 ( 2.52 ) -11.96 ( -1.35 ) 0.50 ( 2.67 ) -19.64 ( -2.19 )
r1 R/D 0.81 ( 0.92 ) -6.04 ( -0.30 ) 1.02 ( 1.24 ) -29.27 ( -1.41 )
rm R/D 0.30 ( 0.46 ) 5.92 ( 0.40 ) 0.37 ( 0.59 ) -19.53 ( -1.26 )
rc R/D 0.36 ( 0.78 ) -7.02 ( -0.67 ) 0.53 ( 1.28 ) -20.11 ( -1.91 )
r1 R/T 0.33 ( 0.09 ) -9.15 ( -0.45 ) 1.88 ( 0.53 ) -29.41 ( -1.30 )
rm R/T -0.84 ( -0.33 ) 4.43 ( 0.31 ) 0.02 ( 0.01 ) -18.25 ( -1.11 )
rc R/T -1.19 ( -0.66 ) -8.88 ( -0.86 ) -0.22 ( -0.12 ) -17.74 ( -1.53 )
r1 BA 1.71 ( 4.01 ) -2.54 ( -0.18 ) 1.66 ( 3.75 ) -6.56 ( -0.41 )
rm BA 0.73 ( 1.80 ) 7.60 ( 0.58 ) 0.60 ( 1.43 ) -11.30 ( -0.74 )
rc BA 0.64 ( 2.29 ) -5.96 ( -0.66 ) 0.56 ( 1.97 ) -11.81 ( -1.15 )
r1 PC 1.26 ( 4.15 ) -12.49 ( -0.92 ) 1.25 ( 3.63 ) 0.94 ( 0.06 )
rm PC 0.73 ( 2.78 ) 2.86 ( 0.24 ) 0.71 ( 2.43 ) -3.29 ( -0.23 )
rc PC 0.50 ( 2.52 ) -9.73 ( -1.11 ) 0.40 ( 1.81 ) -9.75 ( -0.89 )
r1 LL 1.44 ( 2.67 ) 2.28 ( 0.13 ) 1.43 ( 2.34 ) 0.50 ( 0.02 )
rm LL 0.65 ( 1.46 ) 9.93 ( 0.71 ) 0.41 ( 0.81 ) -10.73 ( -0.60 )
rc LL 0.51 ( 1.63 ) -4.32 ( -0.43 ) 0.39 ( 1.10 ) -11.13 ( -0.90 )
r1 BC 1.85 ( 4.51 ) 0.36 ( 0.03 ) 1.80 ( 4.24 ) -5.16 ( -0.34 )
rm BC 0.78 ( 1.89 ) 8.78 ( 0.67 ) 0.63 ( 1.48 ) -11.01 ( -0.72 )
rc BC 0.72 ( 2.65 ) -4.69 ( -0.54 ) 0.65 ( 2.36 ) -10.80 ( -1.10 )
r1 CB 6.45 ( 2.69 ) 0.03 ( 0.00 ) 6.08 ( 2.41 ) -7.59 ( -0.39 )
rm CB 4.49 ( 2.55 ) 11.19 ( 0.91 ) 3.81 ( 2.01 ) -6.92 ( -0.47 )
rc CB 2.80 ( 2.08 ) -4.42 ( -0.47 ) 2.39 ( 1.73 ) -11.11 ( -1.03 )
Results for two regressions are reported, both of the form yi = β0+β1σmi+β2hi+γxi+i.
In the ﬁrst, h is the proxy for nominal wage rigidities; in the second, h is the proxy for
real wage rigidities. See notes to Tables 1, 2 and 3 for variable deﬁnitions.
– 33 –Table 6. Cross-country regressions including semi-elasticity of money demand
y x γ (tstat) β2 (tstat)
r1 D/Y 0.508 ( 1.14 ) 17.636 ( 2.96 )
rm D/Y -0.002 ( -0.01 ) 13.426 ( 2.98 )
rc D/Y 0.096 ( 0.41 ) 9.035 ( 2.87 )
r1 MC 0.078 ( 0.31 ) 16.114 ( 2.54 )
rm MC -0.056 ( -0.30 ) 13.833 ( 3.00 )
rc MC -0.032 ( -0.24 ) 9.079 ( 2.80 )
r1 MD 15.500 ( 1.17 ) 15.711 ( 2.64 )
rm MD 2.602 ( 0.25 ) 13.268 ( 2.95 )
rc MD 5.227 ( 0.75 ) 8.528 ( 2.74 )
r1 TO 0.436 ( 1.36 ) 15.272 ( 2.59 )
rm TO 0.139 ( 0.56 ) 12.984 ( 2.90 )
rc TO 0.249 ( 1.53 ) 8.055 ( 2.72 )
r1 R/D 0.827 ( 1.75 ) 16.802 ( 2.99 )
rm R/D 0.183 ( 0.49 ) 13.458 ( 3.04 )
rc R/D 0.271 ( 1.07 ) 8.895 ( 2.93 )
r1 R/T 2.867 ( 1.29 ) 17.942 ( 3.02 )
rm R/T 0.629 ( 0.37 ) 13.708 ( 3.04 )
rc R/T 0.070 ( 0.06 ) 8.883 ( 2.79 )
r1 BA 1.389 ( 3.65 ) 9.836 ( 2.00 )
rm BA 0.479 ( 1.34 ) 11.072 ( 2.43 )
rc BA 0.452 ( 1.90 ) 6.629 ( 2.17 )
r1 PC 0.985 ( 3.31 ) 11.043 ( 2.18 )
rm PC 0.512 ( 2.05 ) 10.506 ( 2.49 )
rc PC 0.339 ( 1.91 ) 6.915 ( 2.29 )
r1 LL 1.014 ( 2.21 ) 11.694 ( 2.01 )
rm LL 0.315 ( 0.83 ) 11.884 ( 2.52 )
rc LL 0.317 ( 1.23 ) 7.295 ( 2.25 )
r1 BC 1.614 ( 4.77 ) 10.589 ( 2.56 )
rm BC 0.544 ( 1.52 ) 11.379 ( 2.60 )
rc BC 0.587 ( 2.61 ) 6.640 ( 2.41 )
r1 CB 3.552 ( 1.52 ) 11.513 ( 1.73 )
rm CB 2.885 ( 1.73 ) 9.241 ( 1.95 )
rc CB 1.478 ( 1.21 ) 6.707 ( 1.93 )
The regression is yi = β0+β1σmi+β2hi+γxi+i, where h is an estimate of the interest rate
semi-elasticity of money demand generated from cointegrating regressions. The t-statistics
for γ are adjusted to account for the randomness of the ﬁrst step estimation. See Murphy
and Topel (1985). See notes to Tables 1, 2 and 3 for variable deﬁnitions.
– 34 –Table 7. Cross country regressions with bank ratios and market capitalization.
y x γ (tstat) β2 (tstat)
r1 BA 1.630 ( 4.26 ) 0.116 ( 0.63 )
rm BA 0.784 ( 2.09 ) 0.019 ( 0.11 )
rc BA 0.635 ( 2.59 ) 0.009 ( 0.08 )
r1 PC 1.231 ( 3.66 ) -0.057 ( -0.27 )
rm PC 0.777 ( 2.70 ) -0.107 ( -0.60 )
rc PC 0.511 ( 2.53 ) -0.065 ( -0.52 )
r1 LL 1.314 ( 2.88 ) 0.158 ( 0.73 )
rm LL 0.649 ( 1.64 ) 0.038 ( 0.21 )
rc LL 0.522 ( 1.98 ) 0.025 ( 0.20 )
r1 BC 1.841 ( 4.90 ) 0.047 ( 0.27 )
rm BC 0.816 ( 2.04 ) -0.007 ( -0.04 )
rc BC 0.753 ( 3.05 ) -0.021 ( -0.19 )
r1 CB 5.480 ( 2.60 ) 0.209 ( 0.95 )
rm CB 4.468 ( 2.85 ) 0.057 ( 0.35 )
rc CB 2.626 ( 2.29 ) 0.044 ( 0.37 )
The regression is yi = β0+β1σmi+β2hi+γxi+i, where h is market capitalization (MC).
See notes to Tables 1, 2 and 3 for variable deﬁnitions.
– 35 –Figure 1. Response of output to money supply shocks

























































































































































































































































































































3.2Figure 2. Response of price level to money supply shocks














































































































































































































































































































































7Figure 3. Response of real money to money supply shocks



































































































































































































































































































































































7Figure 4. Response of short-term real interest rates to money supply shocks
Responses normalized on variance of money
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